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CASE COMMENTARIES 
ARBITRATION 
The Federal Arbitration Act supersedes state law when a contract provides for 
arbitration of  all claims.  Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008). 
By Christie M. Weaver 
A conflict can arise between arbitration clauses and state laws that assign 
jurisdiction of  a particular issue to a judicial or administrative forum.  In Preston v. 
Ferrer, the Supreme Court held that when parties contractually agree to arbitration, 
the Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖) overrides any state law that assigns primary 
jurisdiction to another arena. 
 Arnold M. Preston (―Preston‖) and Alex E. Ferrer (―Ferrer‖) entered into a 
contract (the ―Contract‖) whereby Preston, a California-based entertainment 
attorney, would render legal services to Ferrer, a former Florida trial court judge who 
appeared as ―Judge Alex‖ on a television program of  the same name.  The Contract 
allowed for arbitration of  any dispute arising from ―the terms of  [the Contract] or 
the breach, validity, or legality thereof.‖  Preston invoked the arbitration clause and 
submitted the case to the American Arbitration Association (―AAA‖) seeking fees 
allegedly due to him under the Contract.  Ferrer challenged the validity of  the 
contract under the California Talent Agencies Act (―TAA‖), claiming that Preston 
illegally acted as a talent agent.  The TAA provided that disputes be referred to the 
California Labor Commissioner; thus, a conflict emerged between state law and the 
terms of  the Contract‘s arbitration clause.  Ferrer filed suit in state court requesting 
an injunction to postpone arbitration and seeking a determination that the 
controversy was not subject to review by an arbitrator.  Preston moved to enforce 
the arbitration clause, asserting that he acted as a ―personal manager‖ and not as a 
talent agent as defined by the TAA.  The California Superior Court partially granted 
Ferrer‘s request, enjoining arbitration until the Labor Commissioner accepted 
jurisdiction over the dispute.  While Preston‘s appeal was pending, the Supreme 
Court decided Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), holding that 
an arbitratornot the state courtmust decide whether a contract containing an 
arbitration clause was illegal.  The California Court of  Appeal found that Buckeye was 
inapplicable to the Preston case and affirmed the lower court‘s decision, holding that 
the TAA vested exclusive jurisdiction with the Labor Commissioner.  Preston‘s 
petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court, but the United 
States Supreme Court granted a writ of  certiorari.  The sole question before the 
Supreme Court was whether the California Labor Commissioner or an arbitrator 
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would determine if  Preston acted as a personal manager or a talent agent. 
 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of  the California Court of  Appeal, 
holding that the FAA preempts state law when parties agree to arbitrate disputes 
arising from a contract.  Section 2 of  the FAA sets forth a national policy favoring 
arbitration by providing that an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration in a 
contract ―shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ unless the entire contract is 
void.  In contrast, the TAA authorized arbitration of  disputes only if  both parties 
agreed to participate and allowed the Labor Commissioner to be present.  The Court 
found that TAA procedures conflicted with the FAA in two respects: first, the TAA 
gave the Labor Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate; and second, the TAA‘s prerequisites to enforcement of  an 
arbitration agreement contradicted the legislative intent that disputes be resolved 
quickly. 
 The Supreme Court disagreed with the California Court of  Appeal‘s 
determination that Buckeye was inapposite because it did not involve an administrative 
agency and found the Buckeye decision to be controlling.  Ferrer attempted to 
differentiate the case by asserting that the TAA merely delayed arbitration, as 
opposed to the state court‘s outright prohibition of  arbitration in Buckeye.  In 
rejecting this argument, the Court explained that arbitration would likely be long 
delayed if  the dispute initially went before the Labor Commissioner, which is 
contradictory to Congress‘s intent to expedite alternative dispute resolution.  
Additionally, the Court believed Ferrer would not surrender substantive rights 
afforded to him by the TAA or California law if  the dispute was directed to 
arbitration.  The Court could find no reason to distinguish Buckeye, where 
adjudicatory authority was vested in a state court, from Preston, where an 
administrative agency was given jurisdiction.  Accordingly, state laws that allow for 
administrative review prior to arbitration are preempted by the FAA, as are state laws 
that divert the dispute to an initial court review. 
The Preston decision is an important endorsement of  the FAA‘s stated 
―federal policy favoring arbitration‖ and reinforces that the FAA preempts 
contradictory state laws.  Transactional attorneys negotiating contracts must consider 
the impact of  the FAA if  parties agree to arbitrate disputes, especially in industries 
where individuals may rely upon specialized and administrative agencies to protect 
their rights.  Further, the states‘ ability to monitor and regulate those industries could 
be threatened by precursory submission of  disputes to an arbitrator.  In light of  
Preston, parties to a contract will be able to avoid administrative adjudication in favor 
of  arbitration, but may also risk surrendering protections offered by state statutes 
and agencies that are preempted by the FAA. 
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BUSINESS LITIGATION 
LLCs can be found for the purpose of  venue where their registered agent 
maintains an office.  Fed. Express v. Am. Bicycle Group, LLC., No. E207-01483-COA-
R9-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80, 2008 WL 565687 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 
2008).  
By Bryan C. Hathorn 
A transitory action is an action that can be brought wherever personal service 
of  process can be made on the defendant, as opposed to a local action, which must 
be brought where the subject matter of  the controversy exists.  Multiple possible 
venues exist for transitory actions in Tennessee.  Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-4-
101(a) provides that the proper venue for a transitory action is ―where the cause of  
action arose or where the [d]efendant resides or is found.‖1  In Federal Express v. 
American Bicycle Group, LLC, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that, for the 
purpose of  determining venue, an LLC can be found at the location of  its registered 
agent and office. 
Federal Express (the ―Plaintiff ‖) filed a complaint against The American 
Bicycle Group, LLC (the ―Defendant‖) in Knox County Chancery Court.  The 
summons was served on the Defendant‘s registered agent located in Knox County.  
The Defendant moved to dismiss the case for improper venue.  The Defendant 
asserted that the Knox County venue was improper because the transitory action 
arose in Shelby County and the Defendant‘s place of  business was in Hamilton 
County.  The Plaintiff  responded that for the purpose of  venue, the Defendant was 
found in Knox County because its registered agent was in Knox County.  The trial 
court denied the motion, and the Defendant made an interlocutory appeal to the 
Court of  Appeals to determine if  the Knox County venue was permitted. 
Corporations can be found in counties where they have an ―office, agency or 
resident director.‖2  Although LLCs are not incorporated, Tennessee courts often 
apply corporate law to LLCs.  Thus, an LLC can be found in any county where it 
                                                 
1 When the plaintiff and the defendant both reside in the same county, the ―common county‖ 
exception to this rule provides that the action can only be brought where the cause of action arose or 
in the common county of residence, eliminating the venue where the defendant is ―found.‖ 
2 Redman v. DuPont Rayon Co., 56 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1933). 
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maintains ―an office for furtherance of  its business activities.‖3 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-101 provides that an LLC must have a 
registered office and a registered agent in the state, and that the ―registered agent 
must maintain a business office that is identical with the registered office.‖  
Moreover, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-102, if  the LLC changes its 
registered office or registered agent, ―the street address of  its registered office and 
the business office of  its registered agent will be identical.‖  Thus, the registered 
agent must maintain a business office at the LLC‘s registered office.  Because an LLC 
can be found at a business office, it can be found at the location of  its registered 
agent and office. 
The Defendant‘s registered agent maintained its business office at a street 
address in Knox County.  As such, the court found that the Defendant had a 
business office in Knox County and was found there for the purpose of  venue in a 
transitory action. 
The court‘s decision reaffirms that the appropriate venues for a plaintiff  to 
bring a transitory action against an LLC or corporation in Tennessee are (i) where 
the cause of  action arose, (ii) where the defendant does business (i.e., where it 
resides), and (iii) where it maintains a business office (i.e., where it can be found—
including the location of  its registered agent and office).  A plaintiff  may bring an action in 
any of  these venues. 
As a result, an LLC must defend a lawsuit in any venue where the LLC has a 
registered agent and office.  As a practical matter, if  an LLC wishes to avoid a 
particular venue, it is necessary to avoid being found there.  While an LLC may not 
be able to eliminate a place of  business in an unfavorable venue, it is possible to 
choose the location of  the LLC‘s registered agent and office.  
When counseling an LLC, Tennessee attorneys should advise the LLC that it 
will be required to defend a civil action anywhere that the LLC maintains a registered 
agent and office.  If  an LLC already has its registered agent and office in a venue 
where it does not wish to appear, it can change the location of  its registration.  The 
procedure for doing so is provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-102 (b).  
To change its registered agent and office, the LLC must deliver to the secretary of  
state a statement which provides the name of  the LLC, the name and address of  the 
current registered agent and office, and the name and address of  the new registered 
                                                 
3 Garland v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 658 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1983). 
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agent and office.  After changing the location of  its registered agent and office, the 
LLC will only be found for the purpose of  venue either where it has its new 
registered agent or where it maintains business offices.  However, suit can still be 
brought where an action arose. 
CONTRACT LAW 
A party cannot enforce an ambiguous contract provision where the party 
knew or should have known that the other party had a substantially different 
interpretation of  that provision.  United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 
810 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
By Christopher M. Smith 
When a contract provision is ambiguous, the Delaware Court of  Chancery 
will use extrinsic evidence to find an objectively reasonable interpretation.  If  the 
extrinsic evidence plausibly suggests two reasonable interpretations, the court will 
construe the provision in light of  the ―forthright negotiator principle,‖ which looks 
at ―the subjective understanding of  one party that has been objectively manifested 
and is known or should be known by the other party.‖  Under this principle, the 
court will not enforce an ambiguous provision where one party knew or should have 
known of  the other party‘s differing interpretation of  that provision. 
The directors of  United Rentals, Inc. (―URI‖), a multi-billion dollar 
equipment rental company, solicited bids for a leveraged buyout of  the company.  
Investment group Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. (―Cerberus‖), entered into 
negotiations to buy the company.  To limit its potential liability, Cerberus created the 
shell corporations RAM Holdings, Inc. and RAM Acquisition Corp. (collectively 
―RAM‖) to merge with URI.  Because RAM had practically no assets, Cerberus used 
one of  its investment funds to guarantee RAM‘s obligations to URI.  Although they 
operated in different states, all entities were incorporated under Delaware law. 
The parties negotiated the merger for months and sent nine drafts back and 
forth before reaching the final Merger Agreement (―Agreement‖).  Throughout 
negotiations, the parties fundamentally disagreed on URI‘s remedies in the event that 
RAM (i.e., Cerberus) backed out of  the merger.  RAM maintained that URI‘s sole 
remedy in the event of  breach was a $100 million ―termination fee‖ constituting 
liquidated damages.  In contrast, URI wanted the right to demand specific 
performance of  RAM‘s obligations under the Agreement, but was unclear in 
communicating that requirement to RAM.  The Agreement itself  contained two 
contradictory provisions regarding URI‘s remedies:  the first provision granted URI 
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the right to ―enforce specifically the terms and provisions of  this Agreement,‖ 
subject to the second provision, which stated that the termination fee was the ―sole 
and exclusive remedy . . . and in no event shall [URI] seek equitable relief  . . . from 
[RAM or Cerberus].‖ 
RAM backed out of  the merger, admitting that it breached the Agreement 
but maintaining that it was only liable for the $100 million termination fee.  URI 
argued that a plain reading of  the Agreement expressly protected the ―right to 
specific performance‖ subject to the ―sole and exclusive remedy‖ language.  URI 
maintained that the breach was not a ―termination‖ (a defined term in the contract) 
that would give rise to the $100 million termination fee, but rather a breach allowing 
for the remedy of  specific performance.  RAM, on the other hand, argued that it 
expressly rejected URI‘s right to specific performance through the second provision, 
just as it had forcefully rejected that remedy in previous drafts and negotiations. 
The Delaware Court of  Chancery denied URI‘s petition for specific 
performance because URI knew or should have known that RAM interpreted the 
ambiguous provisions to preclude the remedy of  specific performance.  Because the 
contractual provisions were ambiguous, the court looked at extrinsic evidence found 
in Agreement drafts, notes of  meetings, and witnesses‘ recollections of  discussions.  
When extrinsic evidence offered no ―obvious‖ objective interpretation and each 
party offered a different reasonable interpretation, the court utilized the ―forthright 
negotiator principle‖ to settle the meaning of  the ambiguous provisions.  Under this 
principle, the court focused on how effectively each party had communicated its 
understanding of  the Agreement to the other party.  The court held that ―URI knew 
or should have known what Cerberus‘s understanding of  the Merger Agreement was, 
and if  URI disagreed with that understanding, it had an affirmative duty to clarify its 
position in the face of  an ambiguous contract with glaringly conflicting provisions.‖ 
The court relied chiefly on evidence that RAM had repeatedly and forcefully 
insisted through draft edits and oral communication that URI‘s only remedy was the 
$100 million termination fee.  In contrast, URI‘s negotiating attorney wavered on the 
issue and seemingly acquiesced to RAM‘s interpretation: ―Testimony indicated that 
[URI‘s attorney] put up no fight on this issue.‖ In response to RAM‘s 
uncompromising stance, he ―replied, ‗I get it.‘‖  In doing so, he ―categorically failed 
to communicate‖ URI‘s understanding of  its right to specific performance. 
The lawsuit could have been avoided if  RAM had deleted the specific 
performance provision rather than making it ―subject to‖ the termination fee 
provision.  The court noted that while Delaware law allows for such hierarchical 
organization of  contract provisions, simply deleting the specific performance 
language would have been the superior and ―seemingly obvious‖ approach.  Instead, 
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both sides allowed the ambiguity to remain in the Agreement.  
Citing one of  Judge Richard Posner‘s articles on law and economics, the 
court acknowledged that a certain amount of  ambiguity is sometimes necessary to 
close a deal.  In United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc, however, the ambiguity 
resulted in an expensive lawsuit without the possibility of  summary judgment 
because a material fact was in dispute.  In addition, although it ultimately won the 
lawsuit, Cerberus paid a reputational cost.  After noting ―the importance of  
reputation in the private equity field,‖ the court criticized Cerberus for ―walking away 
from this deal, for favoring their lenders over their targets, [and] for suboptimal 
contract drafting‖ and quoted a New York Times article calling Cerberus ―the 
ultimate flighty, hot-tempered partner.‖ 
For transactional attorneys, this decision illustrates two principles of  contract 
negotiation and drafting:  First, and especially in transactions with numerous contract 
drafts, it is far better to delete an obsolete provision than to attempt to nullify it by 
making it ―subject to‖ a separate provision.  Contradictory provisions create 
ambiguity, and ambiguity allows the court to consider extrinsic evidence.  Second, at 
all stages of  negotiation, a transactional attorney should be forthright, clear, and 
relentless in advocating his client‘s interpretation of  provisions and his client‘s goals.  
Mixed messages may lead to trouble, especially where the court utilizes the 
―forthright negotiator principle‖ to resolve ambiguous provisions. 
――――― 
In Tennessee, contractual provisions intended to shift attorney’s fees must 
include the term “attorney’s fees.”  Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 
No. M2006-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129, 2008 WL 596174 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2008). 
By Ryan Hoffman 
Prevailing litigants often incur substantial expenses in the form of  attorney‘s 
fees.  In Tennessee and other jurisdictions that follow the traditional American rule, 
litigants must pay their own attorney‘s fees absent a statute or contract that provides 
otherwise.  When a prevailing party in a contractual dispute seeks to recovery 
attorney‘s fees, courts must determine whether the contracting parties intended that 
the prevailing party be entitled to recover attorney‘s fees from the breaching party.  
In Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
held that a declaration of  easements and restrictions that provided that all ―costs and 
expenses‖ of  any suit arising from a violation of  the declaration would be assessed 
against the defaulting party did not provide for recovery of  attorney‘s fees. 
112 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10 
 
 
Cracker Barrel v. Epperson concerned a Declaration of  Reciprocal Rights and 
Easement and Restrictive Covenants (the ―Declaration‖) involving neighboring 
properties owned by Cracker Barrel and Richard Epperson and Timothy Causey (the 
―Defendants‖).  Paragraph nine of  the Declaration stated that the agreement created 
mutual benefits and servitudes that ran with the land, and that if  an owner violated 
the declaration‘s provisions, any party with an interest in the property was entitled to 
legal and equitable remedies.  Paragraph nine stated: ―All costs and expenses of  any 
suit or proceeding shall be assessed against the defaulting party.‖ 
Cracker Barrel initiated suit against the Defendants, claiming that their plan 
to expand a building violated the Declaration.  In its complaint, Cracker Barrel 
sought attorney‘s fees, a request that also appeared in the Defendants‘ counterclaim.  
The trial court found that the expansion plan violated the Declaration and issued an 
agreed judgment and permanent injunction in January 2006.  This judgment 
provided that Cracker Barrel could renew its motion for an award of  ―Plaintiff ‘s 
attorneys‘ fees, costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining [the] 
Permanent Injunction‖ if  the parties were unable to resolve their dispute through 
nonbinding mediation.  After the parties failed to settle the dispute, the trial court 
awarded Cracker Barrel court costs, but found that the Declaration did not provide 
for an award of  attorney‘s fees. 
The sole issue raised on Cracker Barrel‘s appeal was whether the trial court 
properly denied Cracker Barrel‘s request for attorney‘s fees.  The Tennessee Court of  
Appeals affirmed the decision of  the lower court, holding that no language in the 
Declaration compelled the Defendants to pay Cracker Barrel‘s attorney‘s fees.  The 
court concluded that Tennessee follows the American rule, which requires parties to 
pay their own attorney‘s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise or there 
is some equitable basis for awarding attorney‘s fees.  Additionally, the court noted 
that an award of  attorney‘s fees, absent one of  the above exceptions, is against public 
policy in Tennessee.   
The American rule does not apply when parties to a contract agree to a fee 
shifting provision.  According to the majority in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson, Tennessee 
case-law supports the presumption that contracting parties do not intend to deviate 
from the American rule unless a contract ―specifically provid[es]‖ for the recovery of  
attorney‘s fees.  Thus, the court reasoned that the drafter of  the Declaration could 
have ―specifically‖ or ―expressly‖ provided that the prevailing party in an 
enforcement action may recover attorney‘s fees.  Because the Declaration did not 
specifically provide for the shifting of  ―attorney‘s fees,‖ the court refused to interpret 
the phrase ―costs and expenses‖ as encompassing attorney‘s fees.  Based on 
Tennessee‘s adherence to the American rule, public policy considerations, and the 
lack of  express language unequivocally shifting attorney‘s fees, the majority denied 
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Cracker Barrel‘s request for attorney‘s fees. 
The dissent argued that the majority‘s construction of  the American rule was 
too strict.  According to the dissent, Tennessee allows recovery of  attorney‘s fees 
―under an express contract ‗if  the language of  the agreement is broad enough to 
cover such expenditures.‘‖   The dissent argued that the phrase ―all costs and 
expenses of  any suit or proceeding‖ was broad enough to include attorney‘s fees.  
Conversely, the majority focused on the phrase ―costs and expenses‖ and disregarded 
the preceding word, ―all,‖ in declining to award attorney‘s fees.  Yet, attorney‘s fees 
are certainly either a ―cost‖ (although they are distinguished from court costs) or 
―expense‖ associated with a lawsuit.  Since the Declaration provided that ―all costs 
and expenses‖ shifted to the defaulting party, it is not difficult to imagine that the 
contracting parties contemplated the payment of  attorney‘s fees at the Declaration‘s 
formation.  The majority, however, determined that this language did not constitute 
an ―express‖ and ―specific‖ manifestation of  the contracting parties‘ intent as 
required under Tennessee law.   
The court‘s message in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson is clear:  parties to contract 
must explicitly provide for the shifting of  ―attorney‘s fees‖ if  they wish to recover 
such fees.  Contract drafters should be mindful of  this requirement.  In addition, 
attorneys may find it necessary to modify pre-existing fee-shifting agreements to 
conform to the explicit language required in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Defined contribution benefit plan participants are entitled to recovery for 
fiduciary breaches under ERISA § 502(a)(2).  LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 
128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). 
By Melissa Hughes 
The growing popularity of  retirement security plans administered by a 
participant‘s employer has resulted in confusion regarding legal liability when such 
plans are mismanaged.  Over twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a participant in a fixed benefit disability plan did not have a separate cause 
of  action under § 502(a)(2) of  the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(―ERISA‖), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974), for injury to the participant‘s individual 
account.  The Supreme Court recently reexamined its previous decision and held 
that, in the case of  defined contribution employee benefit plans, an individual 
claiming breach of  fiduciary duty does have standing to bring suit under § § 502(a)(2) 
for injuries distinct from the entire plan.  
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As an employee at DeWolff, Boberg & Associates (―DeWolff ‖), James LaRue 
contributed to an ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by 
DeWolff.  This type of  retirement plan, categorized as a ―defined contribution plan‖ 
or an ―individual account plan,‖ operates by investing a participant‘s contributions, so 
that, at the point of  retirement, the participant will receive the value of  the individual 
account.  The value of  the account is determined by the financial success of  the 
invested contributions.  While defined contribution plans are more popular in recent 
years, ―defined benefit plans‖ were once the standard type employee benefit plan.  
Unlike the defined contribution plan, a defined benefit plan uses the participant‘s 
years of  service and quantity of  compensation to calculate a fixed level of  retirement 
income to which the participant is entitled.  
In 2004, LaRue filed suit against DeWolff, alleging that DeWolff  failed to 
follow LaRue‘s directions to make certain changes on his individual 401(k) account.  
LaRue claimed that DeWolff ‘s mismanagement, which depleted $150,000 from 
LaRue‘s interest, was a breach of  the fiduciary duty owed under ERISA § 409(a).  
Although § 502(a) of  ERISA provides six ways in which various parties and 
individuals may bring a civil cause of  action, LaRue chose to assert claims under 
§ 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3).  The district court denied LaRue‘s original claim under 
§ 502(a)(3) and granted DeWolff ‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The 
district court concluded that Plaintiff  sought money damages rather than the 
equitable relief  available under § 502(a)(3). 
LaRue appealed to the Third Circuit, this time asserting a claim under both 
§ 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3).  Under § 502(a)(2), the Secretary of  Labor, plan 
participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries are authorized to bring an action ―on 
behalf  of  a plan‖ to recover for violations provided in § 409(a) of  ERISA, which 
subjects fiduciaries who breach any responsibility, obligation or duty imposed by 
statute to personal liability.  In denying the § 502(a)(2) claim, the Third Circuit relied 
on an older Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Russell, 
473 U.S. 134 (1985).  In Russell, an individual participant of  a defined benefit plan 
sought recovery under § 502(a)(2) for damages resulting from her employer‘s delay in 
processing her claim.  The Supreme Court rejected the participant‘s right to bring an 
individual claim, holding that § 502(a)(2) provided a remedy only for injury to the 
entire plan and not for distinct participant injuries.  
Applying the Supreme Court‘s rationale in Russell, the Third Circuit denied 
LaRue‘s claim under § 502(a)(2).  The Third Circuit classified LaRue‘s remedy as 
―personal‖ and held that his ―remedial interest‖ was unable to ―serve as a legitimate 
proxy for the plan in its entirety.‖  In addition to rejecting LaRue‘s § 502(a)(2) claim, 
the Third Circuit also denied his argument under § 502(a)(3).  
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The Supreme Court granted LaRue‘s writ of  certiorari for the sole purpose 
of  addressing the Third Circuit‘s interpretation of  § 502(a)(2).  The Supreme Court 
distinguished Russell and held that although § 502(a)(2) does not offer relief  for 
individual injury different from injury to the entire plan, § 502(a)(2) does offer relief  
for breaches of  fiduciary duty that harms an individual participant‘s plan assets.  In 
making this distinction, the Supreme Court declared that the ―former landscape of  
employee benefit plans . . . has changed.‖  At the time of  ERISA‘s enactment, the 
predominant type of  employee benefit plan was the defined benefit plan formerly at 
issue in Russell.  A participant in a defined benefit plan does not acquire an individual 
account.  Rather, at the time of  retirement the participant receives a fixed benefit 
amount based on the percentage of  salary formerly received.  As explained by the 
Supreme Court, the holding in Russell ―speaks to the impact of  § 409 on plans that 
pay defined benefits.‖  With defined benefit plans, an administrator‘s violation of  
ERISA would not affect an individual participant‘s benefits without also affecting the 
plan as a whole.  The Supreme Court recognized that for defined benefit plans, 
fiduciary misconduct would not create participant injury distinct and separate from 
injury to the entire plan.  Thus, the need for an available cause of  action to individual 
participants was unnecessary, because bringing suit on behalf  of  the plan as a whole 
would serve the ultimate concern in passing ERISA, to prevent ―misuse and 
mismanagement of  plan assets by plan administrators.‖ 
In the modern economy, defined contribution plans are more predominant 
than defined benefit plans.  Unlike defined benefit plans, fiduciary misconduct 
involving a defined contribution plan can threaten participants‘ individual interests 
without causing harm to the entire plan.  Because the benefit received under a 
defined contribution plan is largely the result of  the performance of  invested 
contributions, a participant can stand to gain or lose without affecting the entire 
plan.  Relying on this distinction, the Supreme Court decided that its holding in 
Russell, which allowed a cause of  action only if  the injury is to the ―entire plan,‖ was 
limited to defined benefit plans.  On the other hand, a participant in a defined 
contribution plan is entitled to recovery for harm to the value of  the participant‘s 
individual plan as a result of  fiduciary misconduct.  Accordingly, LaRue had a 
cognizable breach of  fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for the alleged 
injury to his 401(k) interest because he claimed injury to his individual defined 
contribution plan.  
In practice, an attorney should consider the possible liability a client might be 
subject to while managing, or choosing another entity to manage, a defined 
contribution plan as opposed to a defined benefit plan.  A transactional attorney 
should advise an employer-client to consider the interests and suggestions of  the 
employee and the expected success of  plan management decisions before making 
any changes to the plan.  The potential liability of  failure to make certain changes 
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should also be discussed with an employer-client.  Poor administration of  employees‘ 
requests to change their defined contribution plans can result in a breach of  fiduciary 
duty and significant liability. 
――――― 
A principal must notify third parties of  limitations on a general agent’s 
authority to avoid liability for actions taken under the agent’s apparent 
authority.  BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., No. 
M2007-00200-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 841, 2008 WL 624846 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008). 
By George Green 
If  a general agent exceeds his actual authority, the principal remains liable for 
any action taken by the agent within the scope of  the agent‘s apparent authority.   In 
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., the 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that a principal‘s failure to disclose a general 
agent‘s authoritative limitations to a third party is sufficient to establish that party‘s 
good faith belief  in the agent‘s apparent authority.   
Craig Daliesso (―Daliesso‖) was the branch manager for Primary Residential 
Mortgage, Inc. (―PRMI‖) at its Franklin, Tennessee facility.  The ―Branch Manager 
Agreement‖ (the ―Employment Agreement‖) between Daliesso and PRMI outlined 
Daliesso‘s responsibilities as branch manager, which included overseeing the day-to-
day operations of  the office and supervising all of  the employees.  The Employment 
Agreement provided that Daliesso could not enter into binding contracts on behalf  
of  PRMI without the company‘s written consent.  However, Daliesso authorized a 
series of  advertising contracts with BellSouth Advertising and Publishing 
Corporation (―BellSouth‖) to market PRMI in the Nashville, Tennessee Yellow Pages 
and an internet directory.  Daliesso assured BellSouth‘s sales representative that he 
had authority to bind PRMI to the advertising contracts, and BellSouth was unaware 
of  the Employment Agreement or of  any restrictions on Daliesso‘s authority.  PRMI 
breeched the advertising contracts, and BellSouth sued PRMI for the remaining 
balance and moved for summary judgment.  The trial court granted BellSouth‘s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that Daliesso had apparent authority to bind 
PRMI to the advertising contracts.  PRMI appealed solely on the ground that 
Daliesso did not have actual authority to bind them to the contracts with BellSouth 
pursuant to the terms of  the Employment Agreement.   
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s ruling, 
holding that (i) there was sufficient basis to conclude that BellSouth possessed a 
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good-faith belief  in Daliesso‘s apparent authority to bind PRMI to the advertising 
contracts, and thus, (ii) PRMI was liable for the remaining balance.  Apparent 
authority  may exist when a principal has not granted its agent actual authority, but 
the principal‘s behavior—either intentionally or through carelessness—induces 
detrimental reliance by a third party.  Significantly, the principal‘s actions lead to 
apparent authority, not the acts of  the individual agent.  In discussing this concept, 
the court determined that three elements must be present to establish apparent 
authority: ―(1) the principal either actually or negligently acquiesced in the agent‘s 
exercise of  authority; (2) the third party had knowledge of  the fact and a good faith 
belief  that the agent possessed such authority; and (3) the third party detrimentally 
relied on the apparent authority.‖ 
The court determined that the circumstances satisfied the first and third 
elements.  Regarding the first element, PRMI placed Daliesso in a position of  
authority as branch manager of  its Franklin, Tennessee office.  Accordingly, PRMI 
fostered the appearance that Daliesso had authority to manage the office and make 
decisions that promoted the livelihood of  the branch.  Similarly, the court found that 
the third element was satisfied because it was clear that BellSouth detrimentally relied 
on Daliesso‘s apparent authority as branch manager  
Regarding the second element, the court discussed several factors in finding 
that BellSouth had a good faith belief  in Daliesso‘s apparent authority to represent 
PRMI.  Initially, the court analyzed the facts to determine what authority PRMI had 
actually conferred to Daliesso.  The Employment Agreement established that 
Daliesso had the authority to represent PRMI in a general fashion.  Daliesso was 
responsible for originating loans, completing credit and background checks on 
prospective clients, and making personnel decisions within the branch.  Relying on 
the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in O’Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass’n, 405 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1966), the court noted that when an agent‘s authority 
and power is expressed in a limited scope, a third party is fully justified in implying 
any authority which is reasonable and customary under similar circumstances.  If  the 
principal has limited the general agent‘s authority, the principal is responsible for 
disclosing the limitations to a third party because of  the broad authority the title 
encompasses.  Although PRMI had contractually limited Daliesso‘s authority to enter 
into contracts on its behalf, the record does not indicate that PRMI communicated 
those limitations to BellSouth. 
Although PRMI‘s actions gave rise to apparent authority, Daliesso‘s actions 
and behavior still could have eliminated BellSouth‘s good-faith reliance on his 
authorization.  The court noted that if  Daliesso had been apprehensive or skeptical 
about approving the advertising contracts, then BellSouth would have lost the 
requisite good faith belief  necessary to satisfy the second element.  Conversely, the 
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court acknowledged that Daliesso explicitly and without hesitation affirmed to 
BellSouth‘s sales representative that he had authority to approve the contracts.  
Moreover, the circumstances did not reveal any motive or substantial benefit 
evidencing that Daliesso stood to personally gain from the contracts, nor was 
BellSouth aware of  any such agenda. 
The court also inquired into whether it was reasonable under the 
circumstances for BellSouth to believe that Daliesso possessed the necessary 
authority to enter into the advertising contracts.  The contracts were presumably 
intended to generate business for the mortgage office.  Because the mortgage 
business is usually oversaturated, firms typically rely heavily on advertising to 
increase market share; thus, Daliesso‘s actions were intended to benefit PRMI.  The 
court found that BellSouth was reasonable in believing that that the manager of  a 
mortgage office would be authorized to enter into advertising contracts. 
Ultimately, the court held that (i) Daliesso‘s position as branch manager made 
Daliesso a general agent of  PRMI; (ii) neither PRMI nor Daliesso expressed 
limitations on Daliesso‘s authority; and (iii) Daliesso possessed the apparent authority 
to bind PRMI to the advertising contracts. 
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals‘ decision in BellSouth v. Primary Residential 
Mortgage reinforces the agency law notion that to avoid liability for the unauthorized 
acts of  their general agents, principals must notify third parties of  limitations to the 
agents‘ authority.  A contract between a principal and agent that limits the agent‘s 
authority will not necessarily shield the principal from liability if  the agent exceeds 
that authority.  Although an employment contract is an important step in limiting an 
agent‘s authority, attorneys should advise business entities that additional measures 
should be taken to expressly notify third parties of  the limits on their employees‘ 
authority.  
――――― 
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When an employer’s only liability is based on actions of a “nonparty 
employee,” the employer cannot be held vicariously liable after the statute of 
repose has run against that “nonparty employee.”  Huber v. Marlow, No. 
E2007-01879-COA-R9-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395, 2008 WL 2199827 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2008). 
By Natasha W. Campbell, Esq.

 
The doctrine of  respondeat superior subjects employers to liability for the 
negligent acts of  employees.  However, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals recently 
held in Huber v. Marlow that where an employer‘s only liability rests on the actions of  
a ―nonparty employee,‖ the employer cannot be held vicariously liable after the 
statute of  repose has run against that employee. 
Elizabeth Chenoweth was treated by Dr. Douglas Marlow and Dr. David 
Rankin at Baptist Hospital of  East Tennessee.  While under Dr. Rankin‘s care, Ms. 
Chenoweth fell down and sustained a head injury which caused an intracranial 
hemorrhage.  Ms. Chenoweth underwent surgery to relieve pressure caused by the 
hemorrhage, but died two days later. 
In a subsequent malpractice action brought by Ms. Chenoweth‘s daughters, 
Internists of  Knoxville, PLLC—the employer of  Dr. Marlow and Dr. Rankin—
argued that it could not be held liable under respondeat superior because Dr. Rankin had 
not been sued within the three-year statute of  repose.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment, and Plaintiffs appealed. 
On appeal, the court restated the premise that a principal may not be held 
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of  its agent ―(1) when the agent has been 
exonerated by an adjudication of  non-liability, (2) when the right of  action against the agent 
is extinguished by operation of  law, or (3) when the injured party extinguishes the agent‘s 
liability . . . .‖1  The Huber court found the second circumstance present in this 
case—i.e., that the right of  action against the agent, Dr. Rankin, had run.  
                                                 
 Natasha W. Campbell is an Associate with the Knoxville office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, 
Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.  Natasha is a former Editor of both Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of 
Business Law and the Tennessee Law Review.  She can be reached at (865) 549-7000 or at 
ncampbell@bakerdonelson.com. 
1 Huber, 2008 WL 2199827 at *3 (quoting Johnson v. LeBonheur Children‘s Med. Ctr., 74 S.W3d 338, 
345 (Tenn. 2002)). 
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Statutes of  repose extinguish the right to sue.  Thus, because the medical 
malpractice statute of  repose had run while the litigation was pending against Dr. 
Rankin, the court stated that the harm was ―damnum absque injuria—a wrong for 
which the law allows no redress.‖  The court thus affirmed partial summary 
judgment in favor of  Internists of  Knoxville. 
The court‘s decision in Huber v. Marlow may affect litigation far outside the 
context of  medical malpractice actions because the doctrine of  respondeat superior is 
not limited to the healthcare setting.  In Tennessee, ―[a]n employer is liable for the 
negligent acts of  an employee if  the employee is on the employer's business and 
acting within the scope of  his employment at the time the negligent act occurs.‖2 
Tennessee attorneys should be mindful that under Huber v. Marlow, lawsuits brought 
against an employer under the doctrine of  respondeat superior must be filed within the 
statute of  repose applicable to the tortious employee. 
PATENT LAW 
Patent infringement does not automatically justify injunctive relief; rather, a 
patent holder that requests a permanent injunction must satisfy the 
traditional four-factor test.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
By James Cline 
In a patent infringement action, the district court may award permanent 
injunctive relief  to the patent holder.  Traditionally, a federal court may grant such 
relief  only after a patent holder has demonstrated:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of  
hardships between the plaintiff  and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by 
a permanent injunction. 
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court held that 
                                                 
2 Craig v. Gentry, 792 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990)(citation omitted); see Parker v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (―To hold the master/principal liable, it must be 
established ‗that the servant or agent shall have been on the superior's business, acting within the 
scope of his employment.‘‖) (quoting Nat‘l Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 162 S.W.2d 501, 
504 (Tenn. 1942)).  
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district courts must apply this general ―four-factor test‖ to disputes arising under the 
Patent Act and thus, an injunction does not automatically follow a finding of  patent 
infringement. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., held a business method patent for an electronic 
marketplace operated by a trustworthy, central authority and structured to facilitate 
the exchange of  goods between private buyers and sellers.  The technology company 
attempted to license its patent to eBay Inc. and Half.com, Inc., both of  which 
operated websites that displayed listings of  goods for sale by private sellers.  
Negotiations failed, and the websites continued business as usual. 
MercExchange filed suit against eBay and Half.com in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of  Virginia, alleging patent infringement.  A 
jury found that MercExchange‘s business method patent was valid and had been 
infringed by eBay and Half.com.  The district court awarded damages but denied the 
patent holder‘s motion for permanent injunctive relief.  In supporting its decision, 
the court found that MercExchange would not suffer an irreparable injury if  an 
injunction was not awarded.  The district court reached this conclusion based on 
MercExchange‘s ―willingness to license its patents‖ and ―its lack of  commercial 
activity in practicing the patents.‖ 
On appeal, the United States Court of  Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed in part, holding that the district court had abused its discretion by not 
awarding permanent injunctive relief.  The Federal Circuit relied on its ―general rule 
that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.‖  Finding the district court‘s analysis unpersuasive, the 
Federal Circuit saw no reason to depart from this standard practice. 
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of  the Federal 
Circuit, holding that both lower courts had failed to properly apply equitable 
principles.  Specifically, the Court held that the traditional four-factor test for 
permanent injunctive relief  must be applied to disputes arising under the Patent Act.  
The district court erred by denying injunctive relief  based on the patent holder‘s 
desire to license its patent and its decision not to commercially practice the 
invention.  Such broad classifications avoid the detailed analysis required by the 
principles of  equity.  The Federal Circuit erred by applying its ―general rule‖ for 
permanent injunctions and ignoring the traditional equitable principles altogether.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded so that the district court may correctly 
apply the four-factor test in determining whether permanent injunctive relief  is 
appropriate. 
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In reaching its decision, the United States Supreme Court relied on ―well-
established principles of  equity.‖  The Court noted that a significant departure from 
these principles should not be merely implied by the courts.  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, the 
general four-factor test applies to disputes arising under the Patent Act.  The Act 
contains no indication that Congress intended to create a unique rule governing 
permanent injunctions in patent disputes.  Moreover, the Patent Act states that 
courts ―may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of  equity to prevent 
the violation of  any right secured by patent . . . .‖  Therefore, the Federal Circuit‘s 
―general rule‖ for permanent injunctions has no apparent statutory basis in the Act, 
and the traditional four-factor test applies to disputes arising under the Act. 
The Supreme Court‘s comparison of  patents and copyrights lends further 
support for the application of  the four-factor test to patent disputes.  Both patents 
and copyrights, as defined by their respective acts, are forms of  personal property.  
As such, patent holders and copyright holders possess the ―right to exclude others‖ 
from interfering with their property.  Both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act 
state that courts may award injunctive relief  according to traditional equitable 
principles when that right has been violated.  Thus, mirroring its past treatment of  
injunctions under the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court held that the four-factor 
test similarly applies to disputes arising under the Patent Act. 
The eBay decision marks an end to the longstanding presumption that a permanent 
injunction automatically follows a finding of  patent infringement.  The Supreme 
Court‘s unanimous ruling makes it clear that injunctions in patent disputes will be 
more difficult to obtain under the traditional four-factor test.  The two concurring 
opinions, however, suggest that the application of  the test is somewhat uncertain in 
the context of  modern patent enforcement.  After eBay, the possibility of  obtaining a 
permanent injunction remains, but the likelihood of  doing so has been significantly 
reduced.  Patent holders, alleged infringers, and the attorneys who represent them 
must understand the practical effects of  eBay and plan their patent strategies 
accordingly.
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PROPERTY LAW 
Prescriptive easements provide individuals the legal right to use a route that is 
not a public road and that they have not claimed by adverse possession.  Gore 
v. Stout, No. M2006-02111-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. Lexis 85, 2008 WL 450597 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2008). 
By Kevin Hartley 
In Gore v. Stout, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals analyzed the elements 
necessary for the creation of  a public road by implication and the elements needed 
to establish a prescriptive easement.  The court also addressed the difference 
between a prescriptive easement and the acquisition of  property by adverse 
possession.  In doing so, the court held that creation of  a public road necessitates 
dedication by public use.  The court also stated that a party may tack on the adverse 
use of  land under a predecessor‘s title to meet the twenty-year period necessary to 
establish a prescriptive easement.  Moreover, the court explained that adverse 
possession differs from a prescriptive easement in that adverse possession is asserted 
to acquire title in or possession of  land while a prescriptive easement is claimed for 
the right to use land. 
In 1980, Jon Johnson purchased land in Putnam County, Tennessee, where 
he and his friend, Willard Gore, spent time hunting.  To access this property, 
Johnson often used a route that crossed land owned by Tony Stout.  In 1996, Gore 
purchased a piece of  this land from Johnson.  Because the land was not easily 
accessible, Gore accessed the property via the route across Stout‘s land.  Gore had 
used this route from 1980 through 1996 on his hunting trips with Johnson, and he 
continued to use the route from his purchase of  the land in 1996 until July 2001.  In 
July 2001, Stout confronted Gore about his use of  the route.  In 2003, Stout 
informed Gore that he planned to block the route leading across his land to Gore‘s 
land, an act that would essentially prevent Gore from accessing his land.   
 Gore filed suit in an attempt to preserve access to the route across Stout‘s 
property.  The trial court ruled that the route was a public road by implication, that 
Gore had a prescriptive easement to use it, and that Gore had an easement by 
adverse possession.  Stout appealed. 
 On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that the route was not a 
public road by implication.  To create a public road by implication (i) the landowner 
must express an intent to dedicate the road to the public and (ii) the public must 
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either expressly or impliedly accept the road.  The court determined that the 
evidence presented by Gore did not establish Stout‘s intention to dedicate the route 
to public use.  Thus, the court reversed the trial court and held that the route was not 
a public road by implication. 
 Additionally, the court ruled that Gore did not have a right to use the route 
as a result of  adverse possession.  The court reasoned that an easement is not an 
interest in the ownership of  real property, but a claim for the use of  property.  
Further, the court recognized a difference between the exercise of  possession and 
amount of  control necessary to establish adverse possession and the continuous use 
element of  a prescriptive easement.  Thus, the court also reversed the trial court‘s 
holding that Gore had the right to use the route based on adverse possession. 
 However, the court affirmed the trial court‘s ruling that Gore acquired a 
prescriptive easement to use the route crossing Stout‘s land.  Under Tennessee law, 
the creation of  a prescriptive easement occurs when ―the use and enjoyment of  the 
property [is] adverse, under a claim of  right, continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible, 
exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of  the owner of  the servient 
tenement, and [ ] continue[s] for the full prescriptive period.‖  In making its 
determination, the court addressed three issues: (1) whether use of  the route had 
occurred for the full prescriptive period; (2) whether Gore‘s possession was adverse, 
hostile, and under a claim of  right; and (3) whether use of  the route had been 
sufficiently continuous. 
 The first issue was whether Gore could add Johnson‘s prior adverse use of  
the route onto his adverse use to satisfy the required twenty-year period.  The court 
held that Gore could do so.  Tennessee law allows a buyer to use parol evidence to 
prove that he or she reasonably relied on representations made by the seller that the 
transfer of  land includes the right to use property that the seller previously used 
adversely.  The court reasoned that because the route across Stout‘s land represented 
the only reasonable way for Gore to access his property, he and Johnson understood 
that when he purchased the land he would retain a right to use the route. 
 The second issue was whether Gore‘s possession had been adverse, hostile, 
and under a claim of  right.  The court reasoned that Gore adversely used the route 
because he had neither requested nor received permission to use the route.  Further, 
the court found it persuasive that Gore or Johnson maintained the route and used it 
regularly and visibly for twenty-three years with no objection by Stout.  The court 
deemed this use sufficient to put Stout on notice that Gore and Johnson asserted a 
hostile claim on his land.  As such, the court stated that if  Stout wanted to prevent 
Gore from attaining a prescriptive easement over the route, he should have objected 
to Gore‘s use at an earlier time. 
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 The third and final issue the court addressed was whether Gore‘s use of  the 
route was continuous.  Stout conceded that Gore‘s use since 1996 was continuous; 
thus, the court only needed to determine whether Johnson‘s use from 1980-1996 had 
been continuous.  The court stated that determinations of  continuous use must be 
based on the unique circumstance of  each case.  The court held that even though the 
frequency of  Johnson‘s use fluctuated, the use was continuous given the 
circumstances of  the case. 
 Based on its determination of  these three issues, the court affirmed the trial 
court‘s holding that Gore had a prescriptive easement to use the route crossing 
Stout‘s land.  In view of  Gore v. Stout, landowners should remain vigilant of  hostile 
claims to their land.  Lawyers should advise landowners to object to hostile claims 
against their land in a timely manner to prevent the claim from rising to the level of  a 
prescriptive easement.  If  landowners do not object to such hostile claims, they may 
forfeit their right to control access to their land. 
TAX LAW 
Because ordinary investment advisory fees incurred by a trust or estate are 
also commonly incurred by individuals, such fees are only tax deductible to 
the extent that they exceed 2% of  the adjusted gross income, as mandated in 
§ 67(a) of  the Internal Revenue Code.  Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008). 
By Jennifer Simons 
 Investment advisory fees are considered ―miscellaneous itemized 
deductions‖ under I.R.C. § 67(a) and are deductible only to the extent that they 
exceed 2% of  the adjusted gross income (the ―2% floor‖).  Under § 67(e)(1), costs 
incurred in the administration of  trusts or estates are not subject to the 2% floor.  In 
Knight v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court addressed whether investment advisory fees 
incurred by a trust or estate are subject to the 2% floor of  § 67(a) or exempt as 
administrative costs under § 67(e)(1).  The Court held that investment advisory fees 
incurred by a trust or estate are subject to the 2% floor if  they are fees for advisory 
services commonly rendered to individuals; but that additional advisory fees specific 
to fiduciary accounts may be fully deductible as administrative costs. 
 Michael Knight, trustee of  the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust (the 
―Trust‖), hired Warfield Associates, Inc., an investment advisory firm, in 2000 to 
advise him concerning investing the assets of  the Trust.  The Trust, which held 
approximately $2.9 million in marketable securities at the beginning of  the tax year, 
paid Warfield Associates $22,241 for the services.  On its 2000 income tax filing, the 
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Trust reported an income of  $624,816 and deducted the full amount of  Warfield 
Associates‘ advisory fees.  The Commissioner of  Internal Revenue conducted an 
audit and found that the fees were subject to the 2% floor, resulting in a tax 
deficiency of  $4,448.   
 The Trust petitioned the United States Tax Court, arguing that a trustee‘s 
duty to act as a ―prudent investor‖ under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act requires 
the trustee to obtain investment advisory services, and such fees are therefore unique 
to trusts and fully deductible.  The Tax Court rejected this argument and ruled in 
favor of  the Commissioner, holding that such fees are subject to the 2% floor 
because full deduction under § 67(e)(1) applies only to expenses that are uncommon 
outside the area of  trusts.  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court‘s 
decision, holding that costs are fully deductible only if  individuals are ―incapable‖ of  
incurring them.  The Trust appealed the Second Circuit‘s decision to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the investment advisory fees 
incurred by the Trust were subject to the 2% floor because they were fees for the 
same type of  services commonly obtained by individuals and that Warfield 
Associates had not charged fees for any special fiduciary services that were subject to 
the § 67(e)(1) exemption.  However, the Supreme Court determined that the test for 
deciding whether expenses are fully deductible is not whether such costs are 
―incapable‖ of  being incurred by individuals, but instead whether they are 
―commonly‖ or ―customarily‖ incurred by individuals.  In adopting this test, the 
Court looked primarily to the language of  the statute. 
 I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) states that the exemption from the 2% floor applies only to 
costs incurred in the administration of  an estate or trust ―which would not have 
been incurred if  the property were not held in such trust.‖  The Court rejected the 
Trust‘s interpretation of  the statute as a causation test of  whether the cost was 
incurred due to the property being held in trust, noting that such interpretation 
would allow full deduction of  all costs incurred by a trust.  The Court also found 
that the question is not whether an individual could have incurred the cost, as stated 
by the Second Circuit, because Congress used the word ―would‖ instead of  ―could‖ 
in the statute.  After closely examining the statutory language, the Court found that 
the best interpretation of  the statute was the test previously adopted by the Fourth 
and Federal Circuits: ―Costs incurred by trusts that escape the 2% floor are those 
that would not ‗commonly‘ or ‗customarily‘ be incurred by individuals.‖ 
 Individual taxpayers commonly hire investment advisers and incur their fees.  
As such, the Court concluded that the fees incurred by the Trust in this case do not 
qualify for exemption from the 2% floor of  § 67(a).  If  Warfield Associates had 
2008]  CASE COMMENTARIES 127 
 
 
charged a special additional fee for fiduciary-related advisement, such a fee would be 
fully deductible under § 67(e)(1).  However, the record in Knight v. Commissioner 
indicated that the fees charged by Warfield Associates were for common investment 
advisory services—not for fiduciary-specific services.  The Court also noted that a 
trust with an unusual financial objective or abnormal circumstances could require 
expert advice, and that the incremental cost of  such advice beyond the cost of  
ordinary services offered to individuals would be exempt from the 2% floor of  
§ 67(a). 
 Prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Knight v. Commissioner, the Federal 
Circuit Courts were divided on this issue, with the Sixth Circuit holding in 1993 that 
investment advisory fees incurred by trusts and estates are fully deductible.  Knight v. 
Commissioner overturns the Sixth Circuit‘s 1993 ruling and settles the discrepancy, 
while also providing statutory interpretation and a test for determining which costs 
are deductible.  The case also spells out a loophole for trusts, providing that the 2% 
floor of  § 67(a) of  the Internal Revenue Code can be avoided by obtaining fiduciary-
specific investment advisory services.  The Court complicates the loophole, however, 
by indicating that fees for specialized services will only be fully deductible in the 
amount that they exceed ―what would normally be required for the ordinary 
taxpayer.‖ 
――――― 
In evaluating the reasonableness of  treasury regulations, Third Circuit 
Federal Courts will apply the Supreme Court’s deferential Chevron analysis 
rather than its stringent National Muffler analysis.  Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. 
Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
By Jennifer Neal 
 When a statute is ambiguous, the court must determine whether an agency‘s 
regulations are reasonable in light of  the statutory language.  The United States 
Supreme Court developed tests in both National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 
440 U.S. 472 (1979), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine whether federal administrative agency rules and 
regulations are reasonable in light of  their enabling statute.  However, the Court has 
not resolved apparent discrepancies between the two tests.  In Swallows Holding, Ltd. 
v. Commissioner, the United States Court of  Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted 
inconsistencies inherent in the tests and adopted the Chevron deference for agency 
regulations. 
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Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner involved a Barbados corporation 
(―Swallows Holding‖) that owned rental property in San Diego from 1993-1996 but 
neglected to file United States tax returns for the relevant tax periods until 1999.  
When Swallows Holding filed its tax returns for 1993- 1996, the corporation claimed 
deductions for real property activities.  The statute allowing business expense 
deductions for real property activities was silent as to time limitations but included 
the term ―manner.‖  In a treasury regulation, the Secretary of  the Treasury 
proscribed that returns falling under the statute must be filed within eighteen months 
or the deductions would be disallowed.  Treas. Reg. 1.882-4(a)(3)(i).  Because 
Swallows Holding failed to file its tax return within eighteen months of  the due date, 
the Commissioner assessed tax deficiencies for 1994-1996.   
Following the assessment, Swallows Holding filed suit in the United States 
Tax Court.  The Tax Court determined that the Supreme Court did not intend for 
Chevron to supplant National Muffler.  Therefore, the court considered the six-part 
inquiry from National Muffler and concluded that the treasury regulation was 
unreasonable.  Because Congress failed to include the term ―time‖ in the statute in 
question, the court looked to similar statutes involving ―manner‖ that also included 
―time.‖  The court concluded that the legislature included the term ―time‖ in statutes 
where it intended the term to apply.  Therefore, the court found the statute 
unambiguous on its face but nonetheless applied the National Muffler test.   
 In its analysis, the Tax Court determined that National Muffler and Chevron 
involved the same essential inquiry.  National Muffler involved a six-part test which 
required the court to consider the following:  
(1) whether the regulation is a substantially contemporaneous 
construction of  the statute by those presumed to have been aware of  
congressional intent; (2) the manner in which a regulation dating 
from a later period evolved; (3) the length of  time that the regulation 
has been in effect; (4) the reliance placed upon the regulation; (5) the 
consistency of  the Secretary‘s interpretations; and (6) the degree of  
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent 
reenactments of  this statute.3 
Because the regulation failed several parts of  the National Muffler test, the Tax Court 
concluded that the regulation was an unreasonable exercise of  power and ruled in 
favor of  Swallows Holding.   
                                                 
3 Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 166 (citing Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 
(1979)).  
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 The Court of  Appeals considered whether the Tax Court erred in concluding 
that Chevron and National Muffler produced the same result.  Essentially, the Chevron 
analysis involved a two-part inquiry that affords federal agencies broad discretion 
when the statute is ambiguous.  Under the first prong of  Chevron, the court must 
determine whether a statute is ambiguous.  Under the second prong, the court 
considers whether the agency‘s interpretation is a ―permissible construction‖ of  the 
statute; the interpretation does not have to be the only interpretation or the 
interpretation the court would have selected if  confronted with the question.  
Ambiguities within statutes are considered ―implicit congressional delegation‖ of  
authority.  If  the court determines that the statute is unambiguous, then the court 
never considers the second prong of  the test; the agency‘s actions are deemed 
unreasonable and an impermissible exercise of  authority.  
 To determine whether the statute in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner was 
ambiguous, the court considered the fact that other courts had ―struggled over 
whether ‗manner‘ include[d] a timing element.‖  Additionally, other sections of  the 
code involving the term ―manner‖ lacked the term ―time.‖  In some instances, the 
statutes were interpreted to imply a time element, but in other instances, the court 
reached the opposite conclusion.  Consequently, the statute contained ambiguities, 
requiring the court to consider the second prong of  Chevron.   
 Regarding the second prong of  Chevron, the court confronted several 
inconsistencies in the National Muffler and Chevron tests.  The Court of  Appeals found 
that the Tax Court relied heavily on factors that were not dispositive or mandatory 
under Chevron; therefore, it conducted its own analysis of  the Chevron factors.  
Applying the second prong of  Chevron to the facts of  the case, the Court of  Appeals 
concluded that the treasury regulation was a reasonable, permissible construction of  
the enabling statute.  Chevron deference becomes more appropriate in cases involving 
complex areas of  the law, and tax law undoubtedly falls within the category.  Because 
the regulation allowed a reasonable timeline for filing a tax return and the treasury 
regulation was a valid exercise of  the Secretary‘s rule-making authority, the Third 
Circuit vacated the Tax Court‘s order and remanded the case. 
 The decision in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner clarifies that courts in 
the Third Circuit will defer to a federal agency‘s rules when a statute is ambiguous as 
long as the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable.  Such a result implies that treasury 
regulations and similar administrative rules will carry greater weight in the future 
unless they are clearly inconsistent with their enabling statutes.  In light of  Swallows 
Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, attorneys challenging federal administrative rules or 
regulations should be aware that a court will not invalidate regulations simply 
because the court would have interpreted the statute differently. 
